Husserl, Carnap, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein :: Philosophy Philosophical Papers

Husserl, Carnap, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein snare Phenomenology and unrealal positivity both subscribed to an empirical-verifiability bill of mental or linguistic meaning. The acceptance of this criterion confronted them with the same hassle how to understand the some other(a) as a subject with his own implement, if the earth and temper of the Others experiences can non be verified. Husserl tackled this problem in the Cartesian Meditations, exclusively he could not bow the verifiability criterion with understanding the Others feelings and sensations. Carnaps solution was to embrace behaviorism and eliminate the approximation of backstage sensations, but behaviorism has well-known difficulties. Heidegger broke this impasse by suggesting that all(prenominal) persons being included being-with, an innate capacity for understanding the Other. To be gentlemans gentleman is to be hard-wired to make sense of the Other without having to verify the Others mysterious sensation s. I suggest that being-with emerged from an evolutionary imperative for conspecific animals to recognize for each one former(a) and to coordinate their activities. Wittgenstein also rejected the verifiability criterion. He theorized that the meaning of a precondition is its usage and that terms about private sensations were meaningful beca employ they gather in functions in our language-games. For example, Im in pain, like a cry of pain, functions to get the concern of others and spark others to help. Wittgensteins theory shows how Daseins being-with includes primitive adaptive behavior such as cries, smiles, and great(p) or playful gesture. As Dasein is acculturated, these behaviors are partially superseded by functionally equivalent linguistic expressions. I. IntroductionThere are transparent and alpha ways in which analytic and continental philosophy differ, but this should not make us overlook their thematic and historical similarities. both(prenominal) traditions had their grow in phenomenalistic theories that attempted to reduce all meaning to the direct given. counterbalance though phenomenology was more generous in construing what was immediately given, neither phenomenology nor licit positivism could do justice to our understanding of the subjectivity of other people. Heidegger and Wittgenstein each dealt with this problem in unique but complementary ways.Phenomenology and tenacious positivism both subscribed to the verifiability criterion for meaning (verificationism for short). Logical positivists emphasize linguistic meaning, and in their most antimetaphysical stage asserted that a synthetic meter is meaningful for a person only if that person could use experience to discover the sentences truth-value. Husserl was more interested in thoughts about the existence and nature of phenomena and believed that they gained meaning only through acts of verification.Husserl, Carnap, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein Philosophy Philosophical Pape rsHusserl, Carnap, Heidegger, and WittgensteinABSTRACT Phenomenology and logical positivism both subscribed to an empirical-verifiability criterion of mental or linguistic meaning. The acceptance of this criterion confronted them with the same problem how to understand the Other as a subject with his own experience, if the existence and nature of the Others experiences cannot be verified. Husserl tackled this problem in the Cartesian Meditations, but he could not reconcile the verifiability criterion with understanding the Others feelings and sensations. Carnaps solution was to embrace behaviorism and eliminate the idea of private sensations, but behaviorism has well-known difficulties. Heidegger broke this impasse by suggesting that each persons being included being-with, an innate capacity for understanding the Other. To be human is to be hard-wired to make sense of the Other without having to verify the Others private sensations. I suggest that being-with emerged from an evolutio nary imperative for conspecific animals to recognize each other and to coordinate their activities. Wittgenstein also rejected the verifiability criterion. He theorized that the meaning of a term is its usage and that terms about private sensations were meaningful because they have functions in our language-games. For example, Im in pain, like a cry of pain, functions to get the attention of others and motivate others to help. Wittgensteins theory shows how Daseins being-with includes primitive adaptive behavior such as cries, smiles, and threatening or playful gesture. As Dasein is acculturated, these behaviors are partially superseded by functionally equivalent linguistic expressions. I. IntroductionThere are obvious and important ways in which analytic and continental philosophy differ, but this should not make us overlook their thematic and historical similarities. Both traditions had their roots in phenomenalistic theories that attempted to reduce all meaning to the immediately given. Even though phenomenology was more generous in construing what was immediately given, neither phenomenology nor logical positivism could do justice to our understanding of the subjectivity of other people. Heidegger and Wittgenstein each dealt with this problem in unique but complementary ways.Phenomenology and logical positivism both subscribed to the verifiability criterion for meaning (verificationism for short). Logical positivists emphasized linguistic meaning, and in their most antimetaphysical stage asserted that a synthetic sentence is meaningful for a person only if that person could use experience to discover the sentences truth-value. Husserl was more interested in thoughts about the existence and nature of phenomena and believed that they gained meaning only through acts of verification.